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31A-22-304

INSURANCE CODE

policies. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270
(Utah Ct. App. 1996).
E x c e p t i o n s to c o v e r a g e r e q u i r e m e n t s .
Although Subsection (2)(d) (now (2Xa)(iv))
allows permissive users who are adequately
covered by operator's insurance to be excluded
from coverage in a policy issued to a motor
vehicle business, in order to invoke this exception to the general requirement of Subsection
(l)(b)(i) (now (lXa)(ii)(A)), the insurer must
specifically incorporate the language of Subsection (2)(d) (now (2)(a)(iv)) in the insurance
policy. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State
F a r m Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996).
Invalid policy.
The reference in a policy's step-down clause
to "the limits of the Financial Responsibility
Law" violated § 31A-21-106, which prohibits
incorporation of provisions not appearing in the
contract or in attached documents. Cullum v.
Farmer's Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993).
Release.
Injured party who entered into a settlement

agreement with his tort-feasor, whereby he
released the tort-feasor from any and all known
and unknown personal injury as well as property damage arising from the auto accident, cut
off his insurance company's subrogation rights,
and by so doing was not entitled to further
benefits from his insurance company under the
no-fault coverage. Jones v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979) (decided under
prior law).
S t e p - d o w n coverage.
This section does not prohibit insurers from
providing step-down coverage for permissive
users, as long as the coverage satisfies the
statutory minimums set forth in § 31A-22-304.
Cullum v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922
(Utah 1993).
Cited in Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751
R2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App.
1990); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah
1996).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Liability insurance: when is vehicle
in "dead storage," 48 A.L.R.4th 591.
Automobile liability insurance policy flight
from police exclusion: validity and effect, 49
A.L.R.4th 325.
What constitutes use of vehicle "in the automobile business" within exclusionary clause of
liability policy, 56 A.L.R.4th 300.
Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating coverage when insured obtains an-

other policy providing similar coverage, 61
A.L.R.4th 1130.
What constitutes "motor vehicle" for purposes of no-fault insurance, 73 A.L.R.4th 1053.
Validity, construction, and application of provision in automobile liability policy excluding
from coverage injury to, or death of, employee of
insured, 43 A.L.R.5th 149.
What constitutes use of automobile "to carry
persons or property for fee" within exclusion of
automobile insurance policy, 57 A.L.R.5th 591.

31A-22-304, Motor vehicle liability policy minimum limits.
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the
insurer's liability under that coverage below the following:
(1) (a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of one
person, arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident;
(b) subject to the limit for one person in Subsection (a), in the
amount of $50,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of
two or more persons arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any
one accident; and
(c) in the amount of $15,000 because of liability for injury to, or
destruction of, property of others arising out of the use of a motor
vehicle in any one accident; or
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(2) $65,000 in any one accident whether arising from bodily injury to or
the death of others, or from destruction of, or damage to, the property of
others.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-304, e n a c t e d by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1992, ch. 132, § 2;
1993, ch. 271, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Zjl.a, l*y ° o C0 l 1 5 1 . ^
Liability of self-insurers.
Step-down coverage.
Cited.
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own
vehicles operated by permissive users, under
former law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712
P.2d 224 (Utah 1985).
Liability of self-insurers.
Public policy as expressed in Utah law is t h a t
self-insurers must provide security for damages
inflicted by themselves, and by permissive us-

ers of their vehicles. There is no expressed
public policy that would require finding liability based upon mere ownership of a vehicle.
^ 6 6 3 R S u p p . 370 (D.
Lane y Ho
ell T
U t a h 19g
d
d d
d
former ^
3
Step-down coverage.
Section 31A-22-303 does not prohibit insurers from providing step-down coverage for permissive users, as long as the coverage satisfies
the statutory minimums set forth in this section. Cullum v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d
9 2 2 (Utah 1993).
Cited in Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786
P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Consortium claim of spouse, parent
or child of accident victim as within extended
"per accident" rather than "per person" coverage of automobile liability policy, 46 A.L.R.4th
735.
What constitutes single accident or occur-

rence within liability policy limiting insurer's
liability to a specified amount per accident or
occurrence, 64 A.L.R.4th 668.
Validity and operation of "step-down" provision of automobile liability policy reducing coverage for permissive users, 29 A.L.R.5th 469.

31A-22-305. Uninsured a n d u n d e r i n s u r e d motorist coverage.
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes:
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption,
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household,
including those who usually make their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the
policy or owned by a self-insurer; and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily
injury to or death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle7' includes:
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not
covered under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing
occurrence; or
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required
by Section 31A-22-304;
337
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

were properly set aside where trial court failed
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475 P.2d 1005 (1970).
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground that their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance in another court on t h a t
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v.
Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).

184

T i m e for a p p e a l .
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran from
the date of notice of entry of such judgment,
rather than from the date of judgment. Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124,
288 R2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank &
Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d).
C i t e d in Utah Sand & Gravel.Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah
1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986);
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
B r i g h a m . Y o u n g L a w R e v i e w . — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In
Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham
v. Saw ay a, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
A m . J u r . 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §
265 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to
liability against defaulting defendant, 8
A.L.R.3d 1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.Sd
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and

hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.
Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial,
or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only by
custom, 28 A.L.R.Sd 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 da}^s from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and t h a t the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts t h a t appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
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(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show- affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.)
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . - - This rale is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Extension of time to submit.
—Failure to submit.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—-Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
——Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Applicability.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Compliance with rule.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.

Disputed facts.
Effect of denial.
Evidence.
—Admissions of plaintiff.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Unsupported motion.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Contract interpretation.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Intent to remove trustee.
—Lease as security.
—Notice.
—Wills.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT TO
DISMISS DEFENDANT BURDENE
SHORES' COUNTERCLAIM OF BAD
FAITH

Vb.

BURDENE SHORES and
UNIOR SHORES,

Civil No. 040400497
Honorable Derek Pullan

Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss Count II of Defendant
Burdene Shores' counterclaim for bad faith against Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,
with Mitchel T. Rice appearing for Plaintiff and C. Peter Whitmer appearing for Defendant
Burdene Shores.

oeputy

After reading Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss, the Memoranda in Support thereof,
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition thereto, and after considerations of oral argument from
both Counsel, the Court hereby orders and presents its findings and conclusions as follows:
1.

The Court finds that on September 9, 2003, Burdene Shores was involved in an
automobile accident in which her husband, Unior Shores, was driving; Mrs.
Shores allegedly sustained personal injuries in the collision.

2.

The Court finds that Mr. and Mrs. Shores are named insureds on an insurance
policy issued by Plaintiff which provides liability coverage for the automobile that
the Shores were riding in at the time of the accident.

3.

The Court finds that Mrs. Shores is suing her husband in a separate action for
negligent driving in an effort to collect benefits from the Liberty Mutual insurance
policy.

4.

The Court finds that Mrs. Shores is seeking recovery under the liability coverage
of the insurance policy.

5.

The Court finds that the present action shares facts similar to those in Sperry v.
Sperry, 990 P.2d 381 (Utah 1999), and that this Utah Supreme Court case
provides the rule of law in the instant matter.

6.

The Court finds that Mrs. Shores' right to recovery stems from the liability
coverage extended to Mr. Shores under the insurance policy and not her own
coverage.

2

7.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Mrs. Shores is properly considered a
third-party to the insurance contract for purposes of this suit.

8.

The Court concludes that because Mrs. Shores is considered a third party to the
insurance contract, there is no privity of contract between she and Liberty Mutual.
As a result, Liberty Mutual owes no duty of good faith and fair dealing to Mrs.
Shores.

9.

The Court concludes that because Liberty Mutual owes no duty of good faith and
fair dealing to Mrs. Shores, she cannot bring an action for bad faith against
Liberty Mutual.

10.

Based on all of the reasons cited above, and the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs
Memoranda in Support of Motion to Dismiss, the Court hereby grants Plaintiff
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss Count II of Defendant
Burdene Shores' counterclaim for bad faith. The counterclaim for bad faith is
hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits as to Defendant Burdene
Shores.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I did cause a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND
FINAL JUDGMENT TO DISMISS DEFENDANT BURDENE SHORES' BAD FAITH
COUNTERCLAIM, to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this
2004:

C. Peter Whitmer
P. O. Box 434
Pleasant Grove UT. 84062
Ronald Ady
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

day of August,
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Mitchel T. Rice, No. 6022
Joseph E. Minnock, No. 6281
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE, & JAMES, L.C.
Kearas Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
Fax number: (801) 531-9732
Attorneys for Plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT
GRANTING PLAINTIFF LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
ACTION, AND DENYING DEFENDANT
BURDENE SHORES' RULE 56(f)
MOTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
BURDENE SHORES and
UNIOR SHORES,
Defendant.
UNIOR SHORES,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 050100099
Honorable Derek Pullan

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Counterclaim Defendant.

|

On December 10, 2004, this matter came on for hearing on the Motion for Summary
Judgment on Declaratoiy Judgment Action of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Plaintiff in the
above-entitled action, with Mitchel T. Rice appearing as attorney for Plaintiff, C. Peter Wliitmer
appearing as attorney for Defendant Burdene Shores, and Ronald Ady appearing as attorney for
Defendant Unior Shores.
Also before the Court is Defendant Burdene Shores' Rule 56(f) Motion to continue a
decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment in order to conduct further discovery. This
Motion was raised orally by Mrs. Shores' Counsel at the commencement of the hearing on
December 10, 2004.
After reading Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Memoranda in Support
thereof, Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition thereto, and after consideration of Oral
Arguments from all Counsel on both the Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Motion,
the Court hereby Orders and presents its findings and conclusions as follows:
1.

The Court finds that on September 9, 2003, Burdene Shores was involved in an
automobile accident in which her husband, Unior Shores, was driving the vehicle;
Mrs. Shores allegedly sustained personal injuries in the collision.

2.

The Court finds that Mr. and Mrs. Shores were named insureds on an insurance
policy issued by Plaintiff which provides liability coverage for the automobile that
the Shores were riding in at the time of the accident. The policy number is A02268-209010-1037. The Liberty Mutual Policy includes bodily injury liability
coverage of $100,000 each person and $300,000 per accident.

S:\Shores v. Liberty Mutual\Order and Final Judg.wpd
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3.

The Liberty Mutual Policy of Insurance also includes a "step-down" or "household
exclusion" in an endorsement to the policy, Endorsement # PP 01 93 04 02. This
provision states as follows:
I.

Part A - Liability Coverage
Part A is amended as follows:

B.

The following exclusion is added:
We do not provide Liability Coverage for any "insured" for "bodily
injury" to you to the extent that the limits of liability for this
coverage exceed the applicable minimum limits for liability specified
by UTAH CODE ANN. Section 31A-22-3 04. The applicable
minimum limits are:

4.

1.

$65,000 for each accident, if the limit of liability for this
coverage is a single limit that applies for each accident; or

2.

$25,000 for each person/$50,000 for each accident, if the
limit of liability for this coverage is indicated as a split limit.

The Court finds that Mrs. Shores, through her Counsel, has demanded that Liberty
Mutual pay $100,000 in liability limits under the automobile policy as a result of the
accident and her injuries. Liberty Mutual has denied Defendant's demand based on
the Household Exclusion provision but has offered to pay $25,000 in exchange for a
release.

5.

The Court finds that Mrs. Shores is suing her husband in a separate action for
negligent driving in an effort to collect benefits under the liability coverage of the
Liberty Mutual Policy of Insurance.

S:\Shores v. Liberty Mutual\Order and Final Judg.wpd
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6.

Liberty Mutual filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief asking the
Court to declare that it is not liable to pay more than the statutory minimum of
$25,000 pursuant to the Household Exclusion in the policy endorsement.

7.

With regard to the legal standards for deciding Plaintiffs Motion, the Court
concludes that a Motion for Summary Judgment is appropriate when no genuine
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The Court further views the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party.

8.

The Court further concludes that, under Utah law, insurance policies are interpreted
according to the rules governing ordinary contracts, and the terms of the contract are
harmonized with the policy as a whole. Ambiguities in an insurance policy are
construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage.

9.

The Court further concludes that exclusions in insurance policies are accepted as
long as they don't violate public policy or state statute. Insurers are permitted to
exclude certain losses from coverage by using language which clearly and
unmistakably communicates to the insured the circumstances under which coverage
will not be provided.

10.

The Court finds that the issue presented by Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment is whether an insurer may limit coverage for members of an insured
household in an automobile policy of insurance under Utah law. The Court finds
that this particular issue is unresolved under the current state of the law in Utah.
A

S \Shores v Liberty Mutual\Order and Finai Judg.wpd
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11.

In deciding the present Motions, the Court considers the following judicial history:
In 1985, the Utah Supreme Court decided Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712
P.2d 231 (Utah 1985), where the Court held that household exclusion clauses in
automobile insurance policies are contrary to public policy and the no-fault statutes
as to any amounts at or below the minimum benefits established under the No-Fault
Insurance Act. In 1987, the Utah Supreme Court decided State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987). Two of
the five Judges deciding Mastbaum held that household exclusions in automobile
insurance polices are valid in excess of the statutory mandated amounts. Judge
Durham wrote a dissenting opinion in Mastbaum where she opined that the
legislative history indicated that all household exclusions in automobile insurance
policies were contrary to public policy. Judge Zimmerman and Judge Stewart
joined in a concurring opinion where they decided that only household exclusions in
automobile insurance policies written after 1986 would be contrary to public policy.
In 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals in National Farmers Union Property and
Casualty Company v. Moore, 882 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1994), upheld a household
exclusion in a farmowners policy of insurance, and flirther stated that the concurring
and dissenting opinions in Mastbaum were dicta. In July of 2004, the Utah
Supreme Court decided Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, 96 P.3d 916 (Utah 2004). In that opinion, the Utah Supreme Court held
as follows:

S \Shores v Liberty MutuaAOrder and Final Judg vvpd
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[Exclusionary endorsements such as the "owned vehicle"
exception at issue are not necessarily invalid. "Rather,
contracting parties are free to limit coverage in excess of the
minimum required limits, and [an] exclusion found in [a]
contract [is] valid in relation to any coverage exceeding
minimum amounts." [citations omitted]. As long as any
exclusions are phrased in "language which clearly and
unmistakable communicates to the insured the specific
circumstances under which the expected coverage will not be
provided," exclusions in insurance policies beyond the
minimum coverage limits are allowed. Alfv. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah 1993) (quotations
omitted).
Id. at 923-24.
12.

The Court concludes that Calhoun sets forth the general rule of law governing
exclusions in automobile polices, and this District Court is bound to follow that rule
of law.

13.

The Court finds that the Household Exclusion in the Liberty Mutual Policy of
Insurance clearly and unmistakably communicates to the insureds the circumstances
under which coverage will be limited under the policy.

14.

Based on all of the reasons cited above, and the reasons set forth in Plaintiff Liberty
Mutual's Memoranda in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court
hereby grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on its Amended Complaint
for Declaratory Relief, and further dismisses the causes of action for declaratory
relief alleged in Defendant Burdene Shores' and Defendant Unior Shores'
Counterclaims against Plaintiff.

S \Shores v Liberty Mutual\Order and Final Judg wpd
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15.

The Court therefore concludes that the Household Exclusion in the endorsement to
Liberty Mutual's Policy of Insurance is a valid and enforceable provision limiting
the liability coverage for Defendant Burdene Shores' claim to $25,000.

16.

The Court further disregards the Affidavit of Ryan Farnsworth for purposes of
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court concludes that the issue
presented by Plaintiffs Motion is a legal issue to be decided by the Court. The
Court therefore orders that Defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion for a continuance to
conduct additional discovery is denied.

DATED this ^ l

day of

(VsUM/AW^

, 2005.

FOURTH/UDie^L DISTRICT COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that on this

. day KAJJ ^^cC\r
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MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION, AND DENYING DEFENDANT BURDENE
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C. Peter Whitmer
P.O. Box 434
Pleasant Grove UT. 84062
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on December 10 f 2004)

3

THE COURT: Be seated.

We'll go on the record in the

4

matter of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company vs. Burdene Shores

5

and Unior Shores, case No. 040400497.

6

your appearances, please.

7
8

MR. RICE: Yes, your Honor, Mitch Rice for the
plaintiff, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.

9

THE COURT: Thank you.

10
11

Counsel, will you state

MR. WHITMER: Peter Whitmer appearing for Burdene
Shores.

12

MR. ADY: Ronald Ady here for Unior Shores.

13

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

14

I remember correctly, I have read your briefs —

15

Mutual's motion for summary judgment as to the dec action; is

16

that correct?

We're here on —

if

on Liberty

17

MR. RICE: That is correct, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: I have had an opportunity to read through

19

all of your pleadings, follow it up with some research on

20

cases.

21

So I'll put to you, Mr. Rice.
MR. RICE: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, if I

22

might, before we begin the argument on this motion, I would

23

request the Court allow a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f),

24

to complete discovery and to take the deposition of Ryan

25

Farnsworth in this case, an affidavit that's been supplied
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only to me this week in Liberty Mutual's reply memoranda.

2

THE COURT: Does this go to the marketing practices

3

MR. RICE: It goes to the marketing practices and

4

conflicts with Burdene Shores' affidavit.

5
6

THE COURT: If there are conflicts of genuine issues of
fact, it will preclude summary judgment anyway, won't it?

7

MR. RICE: Yes, it would, your Honor.

8

THE COURT: I'm going to take that under advisement,

9
10

—

because I want to understand more about that.

So why don't you

address that as we go along.

11

MR. RICE: Very good.

12

THE COURT: Thank you.

13

MR. RICE: I should put the Court on notice as well,

14

sir, that I filed a cross motion for summary judgment on behalf

15

of my client today.

16

THE COURT: Okay, I haven't —

I haven't read that yet.

17

MR. RICE: Yeah.

18

THE COURT: Thanks.

19

MR. RICE: Your Honor, I was —

to give you —

let me

20

comment on those preliminary comments as well, with regard to

21

Mr. Ady.

22

Liberty filed its motion for summary judgment.

23

filed a memorandum in opposition.

24
25

We had an agreement early on when I —

when I

—

Mr. Whither

Mr. Ady called me and said, "I need a little bit more
time to file my memo in opposition.

I said, '"That's fine, but
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I only want to —

2

to do it to both to save expense and so forth."

3

I only want to file one replyf and I'd like

So I was waiting for that memo in opposition, and

4

it did not come.

5

held today, I felt the need to go ahead and file the reply

6

memorandum, which I did last Friday.

7

that Mr. Ady filed that memorandum in opposition; and he's

8

captioned it as a motion for summary judgment.

9

serves the same purpose.

10

Knowing that the hearing was going to be

It's only been today

I'm sure it

I have not had an opportunity to review that.

I think

11

it's late in the game.

12

and ought to be stricken under the rules of procedure for how

13

these things are handled.

14

I think it ought not to be considered

That's my position on that.

With regard to the 56(f), I believe that that's

—

15

that the issues will be immaterial; that the motion should

16

be granted, in any event.

17

disputes about the facts of the sale and the transaction,

18

it's immaterial to the motion.

Even though there may be some

19

THE COURT: Okay.

20

MR. RICE: Would the Court want me to proceed?

21

THE COURT: Let me just pose some questions to you

22

off the bat.

That is, we have the Call case.

23

Farmer's Insurance vs. Call in December of

24

the Supreme Court says if you have the household exclusion that

25

makes your coverage below what the minimum no fault requirement

x

85.

That's it.
In that case
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is under State law, that's a problem; it violates public policy

2

and it's going to void it.

3

The plaintiffs in that case then said, "Well, it

4

should void the whole policy," because —

5

directly in this case.

6

be void as a matter of public policy, even above statutory

7

minimums.

8

not going to answer that question."

9

raised the issue

That the household exclusion should

The Court said, "We're not going to go there.

We're

Two years later we have Nasbaum, which two justices

10

say the household exclusion —

"If you're excluding coverage

11

above what the minimum State law requirement is, then that's

12

okay.

We can live with that."

13

MR. RICE: Right, the majority holding.

14

THE COURT: And well, you got the two

15

MR. RICE: No, I'm sorry.

16

—

I'm sorry, to interrupt.

ahead, Judge.

17

THE COURT: Yeah, you have the two

18

MR. RICE: Carry on.

19

THE COURT: —

—

Justice Zimmerman says, "You know,

20

in the absence of legislation, I agree with the two in the

21

majority; but I'm persuaded by what Justice Durham has said;

22

and I think that every household exclusion written after 1986

23

should be void, based on what our legislative history is."

24

Justice Stewart, I think, concurs with him.

25

Is that the holding of this case, then?

That after

Go
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1986, in the absence of the legislature doing something

2

different, then household exclusions above the minimum

3

requirement are void?

4

MR. RICE: Your Honor, I appreciate you grasping that

5

issue; and it's something that I've addressed in the reply

6

memorandum.

7

length one, but I felt it necessary.

8
9

Let me apologize for filing a memorandum, an over-

This is an important issue, and —

there were multiple

issues; and I felt the need to file a 17-page reply memorandum.

10

I filed a motion, ex parte one, for over-length.

11

that at length.

12

I discussed

I feel that that is not the holding and binding

13

precedent.

14

plurality decision and it's in dicta.

15

case, which I believe was a x93 or ^94 Utah Supreme Court case,

16

the Court said just that.

17

not binding precedent."

18

My position on that is that first of all it's a
In fact, in the Moore

They said, "Nasbaum is dicta.

THE COURT: What does Nasbaum stand for today?

It's

Is

19

there a holding there that we can take to the bank at all?

20

Or I mean, obviously the whole case is in dicta.

21

a decision.

22

What would —

could it stand for today?

MR. RICE: Judge, I don't know that it has much value

23

today.

24

Judges were split.

25

They reached

No. 1, it was decided quite some time ago.

THE COURT: Is that where we are today?

No. 2, the

From 1987
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until the present, is the automobile insurance household

2

exception issue just not been touched for 1the next almost 20

3

years?

4
5

MR. RICE: I think that it has not been decided on
point.

6

THE COURT, Okay.

7

MR. RICE: The arguments that I wi 11 make is that the

8

—

9

the personal injury protection statute since Judge Durham made

10
11
12

No. 1, the minority decision in Nasbaum was flawed; and that

that decision has been amended.
THE COURT

I saw that, yeah.

Where it says, "You

can't use this statute to exclude coverage in other areas"?

13

MR. RICE: That's correct.

14

THE COURT

15

MR. RICE: Our position on that is that the legislature

Okay.

16

then went back and said, "Wait a minute.

17

to apply all over the place.

18

injury protec3tion.

19

THE COURT

20

MR. RICE: Since that time, if the legislature really

We didn't want this

We wanted it to apply to personal

Uh-huh.

21

felt that household exclusions in auto pol icies should be

22

voided, couldnf t they have put that in the liability coverage?

23

They've had nearly 15 years to do that.

24

THE COURT

25

MR. RICE: And they have not done that.

And that's

—
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2

THE COURT: And when we talk about the liability
coverage, is that 303?

3

MR. RICE: That's correct.

4

THE COURT: Okay.

5

MR. RICE: That's correct.

So the legislature came

6

back and amended and put provision 2(b) in, which you just

7

referred to.

8

that the other things that have changed the analysis are the

9

two Supreme Court decisions that have validated household

10

13

I think

exclusions in the non-auto context.

11
12

I think that changes the analysis.

THE COURT: What type of insurance was involved in
those?
MR. RICE: One of them was a —

I believe a Farmer's

14

policy, Farmer's liability policy; and the other one was a

15

homeowner's p o l i c y .

16

THE COURT: U h - h u h .

17

MR. RICE: One was in the Allen case.

The other was

18

in the Moore case.

19

opportunity to say, "Public policy reasons, those provisions

20

are invalid.'7 Did not do that. Did not do that. The legislature

21

has never at any point came out and said, "They're invalid."

22

At no point has that happened.

23

Again, the Supreme Court in those has an

Judge Durham comes up with this —

with this analysis,

24

and I don't want to be critical of her.

You know, it's

25

somewhat of a reasoned analysis, but I believe that it's

—
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I believe that it's flawed.

So we have those two Supreme Court

2

decisions that say they're valid in the non-auto context.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

4

MR. RICE: And then we have a whole litany of cases;

5

and the most recent one is the Calhoun case.

6

just last summer, July of

7

an own vehicle exclusion.

8

exclusion, but what the Court said on page —

9

sorry, I've got my West Law printout.

x

In that case,

04, that policy provision included
That, again, is not a household
your Honor, I'm

I believe it's 923.

10

THE COURT: Do you have a paragraph number with you?

11

MR. RICE: Ten and eleven.

12

THE COURT: Ten and eleven.

13

MR. RICE: Pages 923 and 924.

14

THE COURT: Okay.

15

MR. RICE: And I'd like to take a minute to read that.

16

"Moreover, contrary to the Calhoun's assertions, exclusionary

17

endorsements such as the own vehicle exception at issue are not

18

necessarily invalid.

19

limit coverage in excess of the minimum required limits, and

20

an exclusion found in a contract is valid in relation to any

21

coverage exceeding minimum amounts."

22

those cites.

Rather, contracting parties are free to

I'm going to skip over

23

THE COURT: Okay, let me just

—

24

MR. RICE: I'm sorry, were you with me?

25

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm about halfway through.
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MR. RICE: Okay.

2

THE COURT: "Contracting parties are free to limit

3

coverage in excess of the minimum required limits, and an

4

exclusion found in a contract is valid in relation to any

5

coverage exceeding minimum amounts."

6

just a general principal at this point, a general rule of law?

Your position is that's

7

MR. RICE: That's correct.

8

THE COURT• Okay.

9

MR. RICE: And if you applied it to our case, the

10

provision would be valid above minimum limits.

11

THE COURT

12

MR. RICE: Oh, that's the -- that was an automobile

13

policy as we 11.

14
15

The exclusion, though, was different.

THE COURT : Is this the —

this is where the son wasn't

going to be covered, right?

16
17

What was the insurance again in Calhoun?

MR. RICE: That's correct.

The son drives his father's

Cherokee —

18

THE COURT : Yeah.

19

MR. RICE: —

20

THE COURT : Okay.

21

MR. RICE: And he wants to recover under his own

Jeep.

22

policy, but his own policy says, "We'll, cover your insured

23

vehicle

w

24

THE COURT : Uh-huh,

25

MR. RICE: —

"but not — "

1
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THE COURT: Any another.

2

MR. RICE: —

3

THE COURT: And he —

4

"another vehicle."
there was a household exclusion

in Dad's policy?

5

MR. RICE: I don't believe there was a household

6

exclusion.

7

policy.

I don't —

there was another exclusion in his

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

MR. RICE: Let me just read the next sentence, because

10

I think it's also of value.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

MR. RICE: "As long as any exclusions are phrased in

13

language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the

14

insured the specific circumstances under which the expected

15

coverage will not be provided, exclusions and insurance

16

policies beyond the minimum coverage limits are allowed."

17

Now, this Calhoun case cites to the Alf vs. State

18

Farm case.

That case also provides very strong language about

19

exclusions being allowed, as long as they're clearly phrased.

20

There's a host of other Utah cases that I've cited to.

21

I'm not talking about a dozen, but there's

22

THE COURT: No.

23

MR. RICE: —

those holdings, and then you look at —

25

what would happen.

—

—

there's a number of them.

24

Not

Now, you take

I'm certain this is

That our Court of Appeals or our Utah
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Supreme Court would look at what's happening around the nation;

2

and what's happening around the nation —

3

many of those opinions —

4

that as long as it's above minimum limits, you're free to

5

contract; you're free to exclude.

and I've cited to

the majority of Courts are holding

6

You asked earlier about legislative intent.

7

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

8

MR. RICE: If you read the insurance code, the first

9

—

the seventh paragraph where it says, "The purpose of the

10

insurance code —- n it says under subparagraph (7), "The purpose

11

is to allow parties the freedom to contract."

12

Now, the public policy, I would more than agree if

13

it's below the statutory minimums, it's invalid.

14

public policy.

15

decisions from around the country, and the decisions of late

16

that are similar in Utah hold that if it's above the minimum

17

limits, you're free to contract.

18

That's our

That's what we're concerned about.

THE COURT: I do have a question about 303.

These

In 2000,

19

the legislature added subparagraph (7), I believe, (7)(a), (b)

20

and (c) to that statute.

21

be governed by that.

22

need.

23
24
25

So I think the current contract would

Do you —

MR. RICE: Judge, I —

I have a copy up here if you

your Honor, I apologize.

I

don't know if I have that.
THE COURT: No, that's all right.

Let me get one.
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2

MR. RICE: I knew that part of the discussion would be
on 309f and not so much 303.

3

THE COURT: Here you go.

Subparagraph (7) of 303

4

says, "A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage — " under

5

subsection 302(1) -- "may specifically exclude from coverage

6

a person who is a resident of the named insured's household;

7

including a person who usually makes his home in the same

8

household but temporarily lives elsewhere if — " then you have

9

to do three things.

10

Is what we're dealing with here an exclusion from

11

coverage?

12

consent of Ms. Shores in order for this exclusion to be valid?

13

If that's the case, do you have to have the written

MR. RICE: Your Honor, I believe this is something

14

different.

This is not liability coverage when you have an

15

insured making a claim against another insured.

16

whether you're going to provide insurance at all to a member

17

of the household.

18

situation in the Calhoun case.

19

THE COURT: Okay, so —

This is

In fact, that was I think the father's

yeah, and I think Calhoun does

20

interpret the statute.

So what you would say is subparagraph

21

(7) relates to whether we're going to provide coverage at all

22

to somebody?

23

MR. RICE: Right.

24

THE COURT: Not what happens

25

MR. RICE: That's what happened in Calhoun.

—
In Calhoun

-141

the boy had a poor driving record, and the parents didn' t want

2

to insure him or pay for him

3

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

4

MR. RICE: —

—

and so this is the context they went

5

into.

6

his own insurance.

7

different from if Mother and Father are in a car and they're in

8

an accident --

9

We have ours."

He can get

That's something entirely

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

10
11

Under this statute, "We can exclude him.

MR. RICE: —

Mother or Father is hurt, bringing an

action against the driver, the negligent party.

12

THE COURT: Maybe it could have been more artfully

13

worded, but it seems to me if I were read this just like it

14

says, if you're going to exclude a person from coverage

15

which the insurance contract seems to read that way in some

16

ways, because it's 100,000 per person or 300,000 per accident.

17

Then you go to the endorsement, and it says, "The following are

18

excluded from coverage --" or "exclusions."

19

insure.

20

—

Then it lists the

So did the legislature intend by this statute to say,

21

"Look, if you're going to be excluding people from coverage,

22

then you've got to get their written consent of people in the

23

household"?

24
25

MR. RICE: Again, Judge, I think that this applies to
something different, a different scenario.

We're talking about
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if you've got a poor driver in the home

2

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

3

MR. RICE: —

—

and you want to do something about that

4

so that it doesn't affect your rate —

because typically under

5

insurance, everybody in the home's included.

6

THE COURT: Right.

7

MR. RICE: That's just the way it's written.

8

insurance company gets the names of everybody and finds that

9

out and then set rates based on this.

10

So the

This gives people an

out.

11

THE COURT: And so you —

again, you would have me

12

interpret "exclude from coverage" meaning if you're going to

13

not cover somebody at all --

14

MR. RICE: Right.

15

THE COURT: —

in the household, then you've got to do

16

these things.

17

written consent that Johnny's not covered at all, but if you're

18

offering insurance up to minimums for a person —

19

in the household is being offered insurance coverage of some

20

kind under the policy, then subparagraph (7) does not apply.

21
22

Place people on notice.

MR. RICE: It's a different —

Essentially get their

if a person

it's a different

scenario.

23

THE COURT: Okay.

24

MR. RICE: There's a lot of exclusions in a policy.

25

THE COURT: Yeah.
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MR. RICE: Many of them, and we don't require signing

2

off on those.

Again, you go back to those cases that say,

3

"Parties are free to contract with your exclusions."

4

doesn't mean that the other side has to sign anything.

5

have to receive the policy.

6

THE COURT: Those are all my questions.

7

MR. RICE: Okay.

That
They

Your Honor, I am not going to talk

8

any further.

9

in support; and if those are the Court's probative questions,

10

I have laid out my arguments in my reply and memo

I'll at this point conclude this part of my remarks.

11

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Rice.

12

Mr. Whitmer.

13

MR. WHITMER: Thank you, your Honor.

Before proceeding

14

with my argument, I would encourage the Court to read 303(7)

15

exclusion, as you have pointed out, as applying to this case,

16

because I believe it does apply specifically to this case.

17

Plaintiff's Counsel has specifically referred to

18

the Calhoun case; and the Calhoun case was interpreting this

19

particular statutory provision which allowed exclusions.

20

case before this Court today is not in point at all, because

21

it's not with regard to a statutory exclusion.

22

an exclusion from coverage.

23
24
25

The

It's regard to

Now, proceeding with my general argument, if the Court
doesn't have particular questions
THE COURT: Go ahead.

—
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MR. WHITMER: —

the first issue I'd like to bring up

2

again is the state of discovery in this case.

3

term "obstruction tactics," the plaintiff's Counsel prevented

4

any discovery from occurring until mid-September to October

5

time frame.

6
7

By what I will

The discovery that has occurred since that time has
been minimal, and in fact there has been responses which —

to

8 [ request for admissions that were served in early October on the
9
10
11

plaintiff, which do not resolve any issues.

There have been

objections to request to produce.
Out of a total of 33 requests to produce, the

12

plaintiff objected to and produced nothing in 26 of those

13

requests.

14

not be some basis for objection in one or two of those, but

15

there is certainly not a basis for objection in 90-plus percent

16

of the request to produce.

17

That's significant, not because I think there may

He did -- the plaintiff's Counsel did defer response

18

in two requests, and he set out a minimal amount of information

19

in additional three requests.

20

relate to the sales file in regard to this case.

21

Those additional three requests

The reason that sales file is important is because

22

of the affidavit, again, of Ryan Farnsworth, because the

23

information produced doesn't correspond with anything in

24

Mr. Farnsworth's affidavit.

25

THE COURT: Can I

—
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MR. WHITMER: We have a right to inquire into that.

2

THE COURT: Can I ask you this.

Because the motion

3

for summary judgment turns on interpretation of the contractual

4

language in the statute, could I reach those issues, as opposed

5

to the marketing tactics of the insurance company that may go

6

to bad faith, but could I interpret the contract as a matter

7

of law and the statute as a matter of law?

8
9

MR. WHITMER: Well, I don't think you could interpret
it absent the factual basis of how the contract was entered

10

into and what the terms of the contract were.

11

are factual issues, not purely issues of law, as plaintiff's

12

Counsel has presented them.

13

law associated with it, but those are not the only things there

14

is issues of law.

15

I think those

Certainly there are many issues of

THE COURT: But what facts would be pertinent to the

16

issue of whether the household exclusion is permitted under

17

Utah law?

18

MR. WHITMER: The facts that would be pertinent would

19

be whether or not Liberty Mutual provided a policy through

20

Ryan Farnsworth that provided the same coverage as in the Met

21

Life policy, as was the representation as indicated in Burdene

22

Shores' affidavit.

23
24
25

THE COURT: Is it your position that your clients
didn't receive a copy of the policy?
MR. WHITMER: No, we —

your Honor, we did receive

—
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my clients did receive a copy of the policy sometime after it

2

was issued.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

4

MR. WHITMER: After the terms were negotiated.

5

THE COURT: So this isn't a State Farm vs. Call

6

problem?

7

MR. WHITMER: Not exactly.

8

THE COURT: So there's no issue about whether they

9
10
11

No, your Honor.

received a copy of the policy that contained the exclusions
the purchaser did?
MR. WHITMER: They did receive a copy of the policy

12

significantly after the policy was issued and after the terms

13

had -- the terms had been discussed.

14

—

Proceeding on in this motion, I would argue to the

15

Court that the reply brief in this case by plaintiff's Counsel

16

is in reality a new motion.

17

judgment filed in September applied primarily Nasbaum.

18

was the leading case in this area.

19

The defense —

The initial motion for summary
Said it

at least Burdene Shores still believes

20

it's the leading case in this area; but the best that can

21

be said in favor of the plaintiff in Nasbaum is that it is

22

inconclusive.

23

Justice Zimmerman and Justice Stewart would hold that the

24

policy of insurance in this case is not valid as to the family

25

exclusion.

At worst, the opinion of the dissent, and
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2

Plaintiff's Counsel spends a significant amount of
time in his reply brief; 17 —

physically 19 pages

3

THE COURT: Can I just add —

4

what do you think the holding in this case is?

5

—

before you leave Nasbaum,

MR. WHITMER: I believe the holding is that a post-1986

6

family exclusion is not permitted.

7

THE COURT: Okay.

8

MR. WHITMER: As I was starting to say in the 17 to 19

9

page memoranda that plaintiff's Counsel has filed in reply,

10

this is really a new motion for summary judgment, which in

11

fairness, in addition to the discovery issues, the defense

12

should have the opportunity to respond to.

13

This isn't a five-page reply addressing simply the

14

issues that were raised in the opposition.

15

those issues are addressed, it's not within the bounds of a

16

normal reply memorandum.

17

Although some of

So I would therefore at a minimum request the

18

opportunity to respond to that reply memorandum, both with

19

additional discovery, and with arguments and case law.

20

THE COURT: Can you —

21

earlier today.

22

memorandumlate last night, and read your memorandum earlier

23

today.

24

like you need to respond to?

25

What specific —

I read the reply memorandum
actually, read the reply

What specific new issues do you need —

do you feel

MR. WHITMER: Well, the primary new issues relate to

—
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factual new issues relate to statements by Ryan Farnsworth in

2

his affidavit, of which we were totally unaware until the reply

3

memorandum.

4

Second thing relates to —

excuse me a moment.

The

5

fact again here, the plaintiff's Counsel has argued extensively

6

cases not in Utah jurisdiction.

7

opening argument, there are no cases directly in point beyond

8

Nasbaum in Utah.

9

if not totally controlling, highly persuasive case law, that

10

As he candidly admitted in his

That makes Nasbaum, at least in my mind, the,

post 1986 family exclusions are invalid.

11

Now, additionally plaintiff's Counsel has made

12

extensive arguments in regard to ambiguity, going far beyond

13

any of the simple arguments in the initial motion for summary

14

judgment.

15

I believe we need to have time to explore those issues

16

in greater detail to supply a response to this reply, so that

17

the issues may be appropriately presented to the Court, but

18

primarily factual issues, and also so that discovery may be

19

pressed forward.

20

At this point in time, virtually no substantive

21

discovery has occurred.

22

perform some substantive discovery, but because the plaintiff's

23

Counsel has, in my opinion, actively obstructed substantive

24

discovery ever since the case has been filed.

25

Not because we haven't tried to

We would

—

THE COURT: I don't know the answer to this question.
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You can help me.

2

you hold your attorney planning meeting and —•

3
4

Have

MR. WHITMER: An attorney planning meeting was held in
mid September, your Honor.

5
6

Is there a pretrial scheduling order?

THE COURT: Okay.

Is there a scheduling order that

arose out of that?

7

MR. WHITMER: I believe there was.

8

THE COURT: What are the deadlines for fact discovery?

9

I just had them.

10
11

MR. WHITMER: Judge, I don't have it with me.
believe that we have

I

—

12

MR. ADY: Peter

—

13

MR. WHITMER: —

next summer (inaudible).

14

MR. ADY: It's just a —

15

THE COURT: I just didn't get a chance to look,

16

check the last page, Peter.

frankly.

17

MR. WHITMER: Here is Mr. Ady's file copy.

18

THE COURT: Thank you for that.

19

I should have looked

further.

20

MR. WHITMER: Your Honor, in brief conclusion of my

21

argument, the substantive issues in the motion for summary

22

judgment are in great dispute.

23

involve, again, non-Utah cases.

24

Farm from Wyoming.

25

sup —

Plaintiff's primary arguments
Most notably Pribble v. State

The statutory and case law in Wyoming don't

don't follow Utah statutory or case law at all, at least
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as far as I was able to determine.

2

really in point, the Pribble case.

3

So I don't think it's

Another important factor that's been argued is the

4

statutes of Utah related to requirements for rates being

5

separately stated for different rating factors.

6

that's code subsection 308 requires those things to be stated

7

separately.

8
9

There are —

I believe

or is not real separate statement of

limits of liability, which as you correctly pointed out, is an

10

exclusionary limit of liability as it relates to the plaintiff,

11

Burdene Shores, in this case.

12

anything over $25,000 regardless of what the declarations page

13

says.

14

Excludes her liability from

There is no indication on the declarations page that

15

the $25,000 limit applies to Burdene Shores.

16

important to comply with the statute that it be stated on the

17

declarations page.

18

I think it's

It is not.

There is a significant section in the policy of

19

insurance that talks about rating factors.

20

of a rating factor as being a co-insured or a family household

21

member or anything of that nature as a rating factor.

22

There is no mention

So while the policy terms the $25,000 a limit, an

23

exclusionary limit of liability, it is both ambiguous in what

24

it means, because of arguments put forth in the brief.

25

Common ordinary person, let alone a person of 71,
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75, 82 years old, could be easily confused by obtuse language

2

referring to statutes, calling things "minimum limits," when in

3

reality they're maximum limits.

4

An ordinary person would be confused by the policy if

5

they weren't schooled in the law.

6

to 50 would be confused, certainly a person of 71 —

7

75 to 83 would be confused.

8
9

If an ordinary person of 30
currently

These are, again, factual issues that need to be
explored as to —

if we could go into marketing practices,

10

again, these are things that plaintiff's Counsel has failed

11

to provide discovery on to this point, and which we intend to

12

actively pursue in obtaining the information as to how Liberty

13

Mutual marketed to seniors, and especially to retired people,

14

who by common ordinary knowledge have limited understanding of

15

legal matters, someone especially not schooled in the law.

16

For those reasons I believe the policy is both

17

ambiguous -- it's a violation of statute, and there are

18

material factual disputes which preclude summary judgment in

19

this case.

20

to be completed before we can say with any authoritativeness

21

what the state of the facts is.

22

Certainly at a minimum require additional discovery

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, your Honor.
Tell me what it is you'd like

23

me to do, and in what order, I guess?

24

want the Rule 56(f)?

25

What priority?

MR. WHITMER: Yes, I would like the Rule

—

Do you
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THE COURT: (Inaudible).

2

MR. WHITMER: —

the Rule 56.

3

the first items.

4

earliest, the beginning of next —

5

of next week.

6

almost immediately.

That will be one of

I will anticipate filing the motion at the
at the latest, the beginning

Certainly I would like the Rule 56(f) motion

7

The same time that motion is filed there will be

8

a motion to compel discovery, in regard to the many, many

9

requests to produce that the plaintiff has refused and

10

objected to answering; and also to be able to inquire into

11

the competence and truthfulness of Mr. Farnsworth, as in our

12

mind it's a significant piece of the picture; which we haven't

13

had time to, having received his affidavit only Monday of this

14

week.

15

Beyond that, you know, the limits set forth in the

16

scheduling order are probably adequate to give us time to do

17

these things if it's pressed vigorously.

18

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

19

MR. WHITMER: Thank you.

20

THE COURT: Mr. Ady, let me just inquire, is your

21

motion a motion for summary judgment?

22

MR. ADY: Yes.

23

THE COURT: That's not before me today, then, right?

24

MR. ADY: Yeah, yeah.

25

No, and I intend to only argue,

if I can put it this way, to ski a tight line, based upon

-261 I supplementing those —
2

some arguments off of Mr. Whitmer's

memorandum in opposition.

3

THE COURT: So are you just joining in his memorandum?

4

MR. ADY: Yeah, I want to make argument on his —

yes,

5

I'm joining in his memorandum, and wish to make argument off of

6

it, if I may.

7 I

THE COURT: I'm going to —
joining in the motion of —

that's fine.

I hear you

that they've made; but your motion

9 I for summary judgment that's been filed today isn't ready for
10

decision.

I'm not going to rule on that.

11

MR. ADY: Right.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

MR. ADY: Sir, I think Mr. Whitmer's laid out —

All right.

14

Mr. Rice have both done a very good job of laying out the

15

issues here.

16

at all.

17

and

I don't want to trench on Mr. Whitmer's arguments

So if I start to, please let me know.
I want to talk just a little about the ambiguity

18

issue.

19

Versaw, I think is a very important case.

20

is so important is because I think it distinguishes Utah law

21

from Pribble, the Wyoming case.

22

The case cited by Mr. Whitmer in his memorandum,
Why I think Versaw

In Utah, once a Court finds ambiguity, then it applies

23

rules of construction to resolve that ambiguity.

I don't

24

believe that's the case in Utah.

25

up front apply the test in Pribble, and that page 10 of

I think that our Courts
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Mr. Whitmer's brief at paragraph 8, it is -- or they cite

2

paragraph 8 of Versaw.

3

I'll quote it, "Would the meaning of the language

4

of the insurance contract be plain to a person of ordinary

5

intelligence, understanding, viewing the matter fairly and

6

reasonably in accordance with the usual and natural meaning

7

of the words and the light —

8

circumstances?"

9
10
11

and in the light of existing

I think --

THE COURT: Can you give me a cite on that?
MR. ADY: It is 2004 of Utah 73, and I just quoted from
paragraph 8.

12

THE COURT: Okay, and that's

13

MR. ADY: 2000.

14

THE COURT: •— out of the Court of Appeals or

15

MR. ADY: Utah.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MR. ADY: And I think "in the light of existing

18

circumstances" is a term that I would like to focus on.

19

one looks at this policy, and it's attached as Exhibit A to

20

Mr. Rice's memorandum, there is in there —

21

perhaps the very last page -- or near the very last —

22

In my copy it's the very last page of that memorandum of

23

Mr. Rice, under tab A.

24

motion for summary judgment.

25

—

—

That's the Utah Supreme Court.

If

I think it's
yes.

This is his memorandum support of the

Mrs. Shores was required to sign this summary page,
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and on this summary page it's quite interesting.

2

required to sign this, and right at the very top, Liberty

3

Mutual puts in this language:

4

She's

"Please be aware that any summary of coverage on

5

this form is necessarily general in nature."

6

outlined her coverage here as "general in nature."

7

Then the next two sentences are what I want to key

8

on.

9

exclusions and conditions."

10

Okay, so we've

"Her policy contains "specific descriptions, definitions,

Your policy, "In case of any conflict — " "any

11

conflict."

12

control the resolution of coverage questions."

13

her sign off on this statement.

14

It's unequivocal —

"your policy language will
So they make

"If you have any questions, please contact your local

15

Liberty Mutual sales office before completing this form."

16

what Liberty Mutual is telling Mrs. Shores with this form right

17

there is "Talk to your sales representative, Mr. Farnsworth.

18

He'll help you understand this policy."

19

What did Mr. Farnsworth do?

So

Told her it provided the

20

same coverage -- now, this is a fact that's in dispute -- as

21

her old policy, and this —

22
23

they had her sign off on this.

Furthermore, what's interesting about the second
sentence in that first paragraph, sir

24

THE COURT: Did it?

25

MR. ADY: Pardon me?

—
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THE COURT: Did it provide the same coverage as

2

MR. ADY: No, the step-down clause clearly diminishes

3

coverage.

4

our sales rep.

5

or what his help was, "It's the same coverage."

6

—

So they give her this and they tell her, "Talk to
He's going to help you understand this form,"

Now, "Your policy contains specific descriptions,

7

definitions, exclusions and conditions," second sentence in

8

that first paragraph. Not one word in there about endorsements,

9

not one.

That's why Versaw quotes Sant, I think.

I saw it in

10

Mr. Whitmer's brief, and he maybe can give me a leg up here if

11

I stumble.

12

The concept that if you could readily include language

13

in a policy at —

14

terms, and you don't, "Well, we're sorry, Mr. Insure, you're

15

going to take it in the shorts on coverage," because it's going

16

to be construed against you.

17

to resolve an ambiguity or to clarify its

So where we're at here is the summary page sets out

18

here and says, "Look at your policy.

19

trumps everything else; and if you've got any questions about

20

this exceedingly complex document, you talk to your sales rep

21

before you sign this form," and she did.

22

It controls over —

it

Now, I'd just like to take you through, and hit some

23

of the highlights in this document.

I think the observations

24

of Counsel —

25

insurance policy up at the Court of Appeals.

I was in a mediation yesterday regarding an
Counsel for the
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insurance company said, "You know, I have to read these things

2

14 or 15 times before I can understand them."

3

experienced insurance Counsel, and Kirk, I think is —

4

forthright in telling me that.

5
6
7
8
9

part F, section A to this policy

—

THE COURT: I'm sorry, my page numbers are cut off.
you're looking —

MR. ADY: Part F.

11

MR. ADY: Part F.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

MR. ADY: We go to part —

Mine are cut off, too.

looks like you're there.

14

I'm still looking.

15

Oh, general provisions, there we are.

16

to look at Section A.

That's the general provisions, your Honor.
Part F, and then I want

"This policy contains all of the ingredients between

18

you and us.

19

endorsement issued by us."

It's terms may not be changed or waived, except by

Now, I'd invite the Court to read this policy.

I

21

have, and Mr. Rice can correct me if I misstate this, but I

22

couldn't find anywhere else in this policy where it talked

23

about endorsements.

24

says the endorsements have to be issued.

25

So

give me a section or part.

THE COURT: Part F?

20

was very

If you look at page 11 of the policy, which is tab A,

10

17

That's a very

Not one other place.

That's it, and it

If you look at the last page of this policy —

two
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more pages in —

2

signing off and saying, you know, authoritatively, "Here it

3

goes."

4

Liberty Mutual issuing this policy.

5

at the bottom of that page.

6

when I think of "issued," I think is someone

Well, you've got the secretary and the president of
There's their signatures

If you look at the endorsements that are attached,

7

how one would determine whether those are issued, I don't know,

8

because they're all just forms.

9

that these are issued.

10

There's nothing to indicate

In fact, it just has ISO Properties, Inc. 2001.

11

I forget what ISO means, but it's an insurance service

12

organization.

13

Insurance Service Organization, I think it means.

14

forms to insurance companies.

15

Do you know what that means, Mr. Rice?

ISO.

They provide

So what we've got here are a bunch of ISO forms

16

attached in, with no indication that they've ever been issued.

17

In fact, on my —- on my copy, if you page in —

18

a lay reader, a person of ordinary intelligence —

19

know you're not, your Honor —

20

endorsement you would hit

if you were
and I

but if you were, the first

—

21

THE COURT: I'm working to become that way.

22

MR. ADY: —• the second endorsement

23

THE COURT: I'm working to become a person of ordinary

24
25

intelligence.
MR. ADY: Okay.

—
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THE COURT: I hope to achieve that, and I mean that.

2

MR. ADY: I'm sorry, I was talking from the other

3

direction.

4

THE COURT: I know.

It's all right.

5

MR. ADY: But if you look at the first endorsement,

6

nothing's checked.

7

endorsement attached.

8

the one that Mr. Rice has attached.

9

marks.

10

Nothing's filled in.

You don't see any marks —

at least on

You don't see any check

You go to the next endorsement.

11

pages in.

12

limited liability," nothing's filled in.

13

Schedule, here's an

That's five, six

Under "Insured motorist coverage Utah, schedule,

Now, this continues on —

or those two, at least.

14

how do you know that they've been issued?

15

"Towing and labor cost coverage," which is a number of pages

16

in.

17

So

Oh, then you go

Once again, it's all blank.
You can go to "Property damage," "Uninsured motorist

18

coverage."

19

in this entire policy is to endorsements, says that they have

20

to be issued.

21

away, as a lay person of ordinary intelligence, "Well, are

22

these issued?"

23

All the schedules are blank.

So the only reference

You look at them, and one is going to ask right

"What are these?"

There's no signature.

There's no stamp on there

24

saying, "Issued by Liberty Mutual."

Most policies, sir, that

25

I've encountered, contain a statement at the bottom.

Right
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under that signature line on the last page where you've got

2

Dexter R. Long and Edmund F. Kelly, there's a big in black

3

letters —

4

form a part of — " and if you read, "as part of this policy,"

5

or some language like that.

6

block letters, "The endorsements attached hereto

Don't see that there.

So what you have is a summary page that I referred you

7

to earlier that says, "The policy trumps everything else," and

8

it talks about policy descriptions, definitions, exclusions and

9

conditions, and doesn't say one word about endorsements.

10

The policy goes through, if you read sir, and talks

11

-- never talks about declarations generally, or makes any kind

12

of provision for declarations.

13

bit on an ad hoc basis.

14

Always refers to them bit by

I'd like to refer the Court to a statute, 31(a)-21-

15

1061

Utah Code says that "Any insurance policy form containing

16

any agreement or incorporation of any provision not fully set

17

forth in the policy or other document attached to and made

18

a part of the policy isn't part of the policy.

19

forth and attached and made part of the policy."

20

is certainly in my view isn't fully set forth, and made part

21

of the policy, these endorsements.

22

Then at Versaw —

Fully set
Well, this

at Versaw again, at paragraph 25,

23

the Supreme Court says, "We've also stated that ambiguous or

24

uncertain language in an insurance contract that is very

25

susceptible to different interpretations should be construed
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in favor of coverage.

Insurance contract has inconsistent

2

provisions; one which can be construed against coverage and

3

one which can be construed in favor of coverage, the contract

4

should be construed in favor of coverage."

5

Well, other ambiguities.

6

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. How is the endorsement

Define this

—

7

itself —

what is your fairly susceptible interpretation in

8

subsection (b) in the endorsement issue, the language, "We do

9

not provide liability coverage for any insured."

10

MR. ADY: Let me get to that, sir, if I may.

11

THE COURT: It's —

12

provisions, Utah

I'm sorry —

"Amendment of policy

—"

13

MR. ADY: I just looked at it before coming to Court.

14

THE COURT: I think the issue that would be before me

15

is are there two reasonable interpretations of the endorsement

16

itself, and --

17

MR. ADY: Ah.

18

THE COURT: —

19
20

as you're concerned.
MR. ADY: I think there's more than one reasonable

21

interpretation.

22

Mr. Whitmer' s brief —

23

and I wonder what those might be, as far

I'd like to go through those and expanding on
memorandum.

First of all, look at the forerunning of this, sir.

24

You've got part one, Roman Numeral I, part A.

25

I, part A, liability coverage.

So Roman Numeral

That's what part A addresses.
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Then you've got three subs, three subparts; (a), (b), (c).

2

Okay?

3

got under subpart (c)(1) and (2) for other insurance -- (1),

4

(2) and (3).

Now, notice that sub —

5

and then you go over and you've

Then you've got a part II, Roman Numeral II, part (c),

6

uninsured motorist coverage.

7

part (b). I don't think it's of any real consequence, other

8

than it's going to cause more questions in the mind of a lay

9

person.

10
11

I don't know what happened to

THE COURT: It just wasn't amended, I suppose.

It is

what it is in the policy.

12

MR. ADY: Yeah, and a lay person, I guess, would have

13

to sit and stew on that for quite some time, but here's the

14

thing.

15

at this, and I don't think that Mrs. Shores concedes that she

16

had to have read the endorsement.

17

Under part A, liability coverage, a lay person looks

I think, for the sake of argument, I think as I

18

understand her position is, you know, "You never issued these

19

endorsements.

20

the summary page, saying that I didn't need to look at these,

21

and told me to talk to the agent, which I did, and he told me I

22

had coverage."

23

You never filled in the schedules.

You gave me

So I think the endorsements, you don't even have to

24

look at; but if you do, for the sake of argument, then I think

25

you get the issues like this.

Part 1(a) purports to replace
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the paragraph A of the insuring agreement, and if you soldier

2

and slug on through this verbiage, you get to part 1(b), and it

3

says, "The limits of liability for this coverage."

4

Now, you've just gotten rid of part A —

or paragraph

5

A, with part A.

Part B talks about third line down in that

6

paragraph, that "The limits of liability for this coverage

7

exceed."

That line.

Can you see that, sir?

8

THE COURT: I do, yeah.

9

MR. ADY: "The limits of liability for this coverage

10

exceed."

11

look at paragraph A, because it's gone now.

12

that.

13

Well, where do I find that at?

Hm, where would I go for that?

Well, I don't go
Part A covers

I'm a lay reader.

Go down to the Provo Library and pour over the Utah

14

code, and you will eventually conclude that the only limits you

15

can find are those stated in 31 (a)-22-304.

16

Stated rights, and they're repeated verbatim in the policy; and

17

they're stated as the minimum limits.

18

that mean?

19

not maximum limits.

20

There they are.

Well, what does

Because they're repeatedly stated to be minimum,

Then you look at this again, and you wonder "To the

21

extent that the limits of liability of this coverage exceed,"

22

what does that mean, then?

23

you've got coverage, because the policy told us to rely upon

24

it, and so you're looking at it that way.

25

Your agent's already told you that

Now, is this a reference to the Utah code?

I mean,
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that's a reasonable conclusion.

2

lay reader would conclude it doesn't affect your coverage under

3

the policy, given that the minimum coverage stated in the last

4

sentence of subpart 1(a) adopts the language in the Utah code.

5

Part 1(b), pardon me, adopts the language in the Utah code.

6

If it is, I would con —

the

Is that line, "The limits of liability for this

7

coverage exceed," is it a reference to the old policy term

8

now replaced by subpart 1(a), and in that case, because the

9

old paragraph A of the insurance agreement no longer applies,

10

mustn't the lay reader conclude that this coverage refers to

11

the old paragraph A, so that the lay reader does have excess

12

coverage under the endorsement.

13

You're sitting there and you're going, "Well, if that

14

refers to the old paragraph A — " it doesn't say what it refers

15

to.

16

paragraph A, we've got a new subpart (a), and therefore I

17

guess I've got coverage, because it doesn't apply.

It's an ambiguous reference.

18

If it does refer to the old

Or is it a reference to the subpart 1(a) of this

19

endorsement, meaning that so long as the limits stated in the

20

declaration exceed those in this endorsement, this endorsement

21

does not apply?

22

limits.

23

Because they keep talking about minimum

Or is it a limited reference to other insurance?

24

Because you've got subpart (c) under part A, "Other insurance,"

25

and is that what this is all leading down to, because you go
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from (a) to (b) to (c). So what it's saying is if we have

2

other insurance, then these —- we can't exceed these minimum

3

limits for liability, because you've got in big bold letters

4

other insurance there.

5

The fact that they put other insurance under that

6

liability coverage, and then over at part II, which is a full

7

heading part II, Roman Numeral II, uninsured motorist coverage,

8

just reinforces that belief that all they're really talking

9

about here is if I've got other insurance, then, darn it, I'm

10
11

limited, as that line says, to this kind of liability coverage.
So there's a number of alternative readings because

12

of that ambiguous reference in subpart (b) to this endorsement.

13

So in summary, sir, our position —

14

Mr. Whitmer's argument, first of all, Liberty gave her the

15

summary page.

They told her, "Don't look at the endorsements.

16

Look at this.

That controls.

17

If you have questions talk to your agent."

18

I would say in support of

That trumps everything else.

She talked to Farnsworth.

He told her she had the

19

same coverage, and that's the interpretation they told her to

20

use, and that's the one she used, and I think they created the

21

ambiguity.

22

They're bound under Versaw and cases supporting it.

Even if you get to the endorsement, as I've pointed

23

out, there's a number of ambiguities because of that ambiguous

24

reference of that one line.

25

could very easily conclude that they're only talking about

What is it talking about?

One

-391

other insurance, because they include it in the same subpart,

2

and I gave you some other arguments that I won't repeat.

3

are my suggestions, sir.

4

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ady.

5

MR. RICE: Your Honor, may I respond?

6

THE COURT: You may.

7

MR. RICE: Okay.

Judge, I can only refer you to the

8

case law, and comparing some of those provisions that have

9

been upheld to this provision.

10

Those

This is actually much more

clear than provisions that have been upheld in the case law.

11

This says under B, "The following exclusion is added."

12

How much more plain could that be? "We do not provide liability

13

coverage for any insured for bodily injury."

14

straightforward, pretty plain.

15

That's fairly

Again, I'll refer you to the case law where they've

16

upheld household exclusions.

17

that, or a variant of that.

18

okay.

19

They have language similar to
The Courts have said, "Yes, that's

That passes the test."
Liberty did something a little bit extra.

As you look

20

at the case law, you'll see that many of those provisions that

21

were upheld didn't include the information about the minimum

22

limits.

23

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

24

MR. RICE: Some of them said —

25

some of them just said,

"To the extent they don't exceed the applicable minimum
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limits," but then they didn't go the next step and put in what

2

those limits are.

3

makes it more plain and straightforward.

4

Liberty took the time to do that.

That even

It's referring again to the Utah code, so the reader

5

knows where to go.

6

get somebody involved, at least they know where to go to look

7

that up.

8
9

They feel like they get —• if they have to

I just don't know how you could come up with any
multiple meanings, omission of terms, any unclarity with a

10

statement that says, "We do not provide liability coverage for

11

any insured for bodily injury."

12
13
14

THE COURT: Are I and II quoted directly out of the
statute?
MR. RICE: I don't believe that they're direct, but

15

they're similar.

16

argument.

17

issue, and making it into something it's not.

18

was provided.

19

letter says, "Please read your policy and each endorsement

20

carefully."

21

Now, to the argument that —

this endorsement

The defendants have done a good job of clouding this

It was in the policy.

The endorsement

The first page, the cover

Under the agreement, the first sentence, "In return

22

for payment of the premium, and subject to all terms of the

23

policy, we agree with you as follows."

24
25

Not only that, but the declarations actually did refer
to the endorsements, numbered them.

There's a reference to
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that.

2

endorsements.

3

Nowf it doesn't lay it outr but it refers to the
Again, now

—

THE COURT: Is it undisputed that the policy as it

4

exists in Exhibit A to your memorandum is the policy that was

5

provided to

—

6

MR. RICE: Undisputed from our angle.

7

THE COURT: I don't —

8

think, before

9

I really need to know that, I

—

MR. WHITMER: Your Honor

—

10

THE COURT: Is this what she got?

11

MR. WHITMER: The substantive terms are the same.

12

However, there was much other information included in the

13

policy as delivered to the Shores —

14

Shores.

15

as delivered to Burdene

That's included on the answer, I believe.
MR. RICE: Your Honor, it seems to me if that's an

16

issue, where is it?

If that's an issue in this case, where is

17

it in a memorandum in opposition?

You know

—

18

THE COURT: I'm just inquiring of the limits.

19

MR. RICE: Okay, all right.

I lose a little bit of

20

patience when I talk about things that aren't before the Court,

21

when today's the day to decide this issue.

22

Again, I'll refer to the opinions that I've cited to.

23

It doesn't matter if it's a provisions and an endorsement.

24

It's still a valid provision.

25

whole.

Policies are to be read as a

They're to be considered as a whole.

That's what the
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Judges have found.

2

Moving onto the discovery issue.

Judge, I think

3

if you're going to file a Rule 56(f) motion on a motion for

4

summary judgment, it has to be before the Court.

5

with a memorandum in opposition, with an affidavit and properly

6

done.

7

It has to be

This is the first I've heard of a Rule 56(f) motion.

8

Now, I feel a little bit like I'm being railroaded here and

9

slandered on discovery.

We've responded to the discovery, and

10

we have asserted some valid objections.

11

whole lot of request for production and request for admissions.

12

A lot of them are immaterial to the case.

13

some valid objections.

14

Mr. Whitmer served a

So we've asserted

Your Honor, we're here today because we feel that this

15

issue is ripe and ready.

16

This is a question of law.

17

I agree with your prior statement.
This is a legal issue.

Now, the only issue that could arguably be factual is

18

did Mr. Farnsworth fail to disclose the household exclusion, or

19

did he misrepresent it in some way?

20

length in the reply memorandum, but let me just emphasize a few

I've talked about that at

21 I things.
22

First of all, we will admit that he didn't talk about

23

the household exclusion.

He didn't talk about any of the other

24

exclusions either.

25

don't do that at that point.

It's not common practice to do so.

You

You don't go through and go
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through every limitation and exclusion.

2

The insured is provided with the policy, and the first

3

page reads, "Please read your policy and each endorsement

4

carefully."

5

months before the accident?

6

There were no questions.

7

up.

No.

Did Mr. Farnsworth?

No.

There was nothing that was brought

The policy was provided.

8
9

Did Liberty Mutual get a call in the next nine

Now, that's part of the argument.

The second part

that completely undercuts and undermines this argument about

10

misrepresentation is that the Met Life policy had a household

11

exclusion.

12

100/300 coverage, but you've also got a household exclusion in

13

the Met Life policy.

14

It had one in there.

So not only do you have the

So let's assume for a minute Mr. Farnsworth did say

15

the coverage is the same.

16

representation, right down to the household exclusion, because

17

it's in there, in the Met Life policy.

18

That's an accurate

Now, Mr. Whitmer argues that that exclusion is not

19

valid.

20

about today.

21

not valid.

22

You know what?

Well, that's the same argument we're here talking
You know, if this one isn't valid, that one's
If that one's valid, this one's valid.

THE COURT: And can you just help me.

This is a

23

declaratory judgment action brought by your client to determine

24

what this means, right?

25

MR. RICE: Correct.

-44THE COURT: And the counterclaim for bad faith was
dismissed on motion for summary judgment.
MR. RICE: Only Burdene's.
THE COURT: Only Burdene's?
MR. RICE: Mr. Ady f s client still has one pending.
THE COURT: Okay.

So if I were to rule in your favor

today, what would be left?

Yourve brought the dec action.

Is

all that's left the counterclaim for bad faith?
MR. RICE: That is correct.

Your Honor, I did things

surgically, and there's a rhyme and a reason for that.

First

of all, based on the Court's ruling in July, I felt that
Burdene did not have standing to bring a bad faith claim.

So

I immediately brought that motion.
Then I brought this motion because I felt like it is a
legal issue that can be decided without any discovery.

Then my

feeling is that depending on how the Court decides this issue
•— that issue, that has a bearing on Mr. Shores' counterclaim
for bad faith.

So yes

—

THE COURT: As to whether there was a material breach,
right?

Bad faith requires a material breach in the contract,

and if I were to rule in your favor then there is none?
MR. RICE: Correct.
approached it like I did.
not necessary.

That's —

your Honor, that's why I

Judge, I believe that discovery is

The issues are here.

They're before the Court.

Discovery is also only going to create more expense.

I will
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flatly admit that there is a dispute as to what Mr. Farnsworth

2

said and what Mrs. Shore said.

3

THE COURT: Can I disregard

4

MR. RICE: Immaterial.

5

THE COURT: —

6
7

—

everything in Mr. Farnsworth's affidavit

and rule on this legal issue today?
MR. RICE: I believe, your Honor, that you can.

I

8

provided that to give the Court some —

a better understanding

9

of the issues of the case, but I believe that you can accept

10

what Burdene has said.

Not the legal representations, not

11

statements like "There was a misrepresentation."

12

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

13

MR. RICE: But the factual part, I think you can still

14

rule on this, keeping in mind, Judge, that in the Met Life

15

policy there was a household exclusion.

16

THE COURT: All right.

17

MR. RICE: Which I think completely destroys any

18
19

argument or misrepresentation.
THE COURT: Okay, and so other than that alleged

20

misrepresentation, I can disregard everything Mr. Farnsworth

21

says in his affidavit?

22

MR. RICE: For purposes of this motion?

23

THE COURT: Right.

24

MR. RICE: Judge, I think that's correct, because the

25

issue of whether the provision is valid, that's a legal issue.
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THE COURT: And I guess that's what I'm getting to; is

2

if what you're doing is presenting to me the legal issue of

3

are household exclusions in excess of minimum limits lawful

4

in Utah, that's requiring me to interpret Call and Nasbaum and

5

Calhoun

—

6

MR. RICE: Correct.

7

THE COURT: —

8

and the statute, and simply rule on that

legal question.

9

MR. RICE: Correct.

Correct, and I would add to that

10

that if the Court is considering any factual issue about the

11

misrepresentation, there is no issue there.

12

material issue, because there's no misrepresentation.

13
14

THE COURT: Could I —

There's no

I can't remember.

provide me the Met Life policy, or all the

Did you

—

15

MR. RICE: The opposing attorney did.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MR. WHITMER: It's attached to Burdene Shores'

18

I can't remember.

affidavit, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: That's right.

20

MR. RICE: I don't think discovery is going to further

21

—

22

the material issues.

Okay.

I don't think it's going to advance anything with regard to

23

THE COURT: Oh, there it is.

24

MR. RICE: Judge, I believe that exclusion's on page 4

25

of 24.

Okay.
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THE COURT

2

MR. RICE: Page 4 of 24, subparagraph (i) •

3

THE COURT

4

What is it, I'm sorry?

Page 4?

I haven't read the whole policy, but is

this an exclusion, even of minimum requirements?

5

MR. RICE: It is.

6

THE COURT

7

MR. RICE: It is, Judge.

8

THE COURT . Probably not enforceable.

9

MR. RICE: Judge, let me comment on that.

10

It reads like that.

Nasbaum was

the same way

11

THE COURT

12

MR. RICE: It would be enforceable above the minimum

Yes.

13

limits . Any Court deciding on this would come in and say,

14

"Minimum limits, you're right.

It's not enforceable."

15

THE COURT

16

MR. RICE: Above that, it is.

17

THE COURT

18

Right.

And your point is that your client was more

descript ive than they needed to be?

19

MR. RICE: Yes.

20

THE COURT • Okay.

21

MR. RICE: And that the positions are exactly the same.

22

The coverages are the same.

23

There's no misrepres entation.

THE COURT : All right.

Counsel, I'd like to —

I feel

24

like I've done a lot of research and preparation for today's

25

hearing.

If you'll give me a few minutes, I want to go through
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my notes and look one more time at a couple of cases.

2

If I can rule from the bench, I'll come out and do it

3

in about 15 minutes.

If having done that, I feel like I need

4

more time —

5

then I'll come out and do that, too, but if you can give me

6

about 15 minutes, we'll be in recess.

and I also want to think about the 56(f) issue

7

(Recess taken)

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9

—

We'll go back on the record in the

matter of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company vs. Burdene Shores

10

and Unior Shores.

The record should reflect that Counsel for

11

the parties are present.

12

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's

13

motion for summary judgment as to its declaratory judgment

14

action.

15

whether parties to an insurance contract may limit motor

16

vehicle liability coverage for household members of the

17

insured in excess of minimum required limits under State law.

18

The defendants in this matter have made a Rule 56(f)

Specifically the issue presented to the Court is

19

motion today.

That rule provides that should it appear from

20

the affidavit of a party opposing the motion, that he cannot,

21

for reasons stated, present by affidavit facts essential to

22

justify his opposition, the Court may refuse the application

23

for judgment, or may order a continuance to permit affidavits

24

to be obtained, or depositions to be taken or discovery to be

25

had; or make such other order as is just.
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The basis for the Rule 56(f) motion primarily arises

2

out of the filing of an affidavit in conjunction with the

3

plaintiff's reply brief. It's the affidavit of Ryan Farnsworth.

4

For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the Court

5

disregards in its entirety the affidavit of Mr. Farnsworth, and

6

can reach the issue of law presented; and therefore denies the

7

Rule 56(f) motion for summary judgment, noting that pursuant

8

to Rule 56(a), a party seeking to recover upon a claim for

9

declaratory judgment; namely for summary judgment at any time

10

after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the

11

action.

12

In reaching the issue presented, the Court construes

13

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

14

Insurance contracts are not subject to a negotiation between

15

the parties.

16

favor of the coverage and in favor of the insured, with respect

17

to any ambiguities in that contract. Exceptions and limitations

18

on coverage are permissible in an insurance contract unless

19

they violate statute or public policy.

20

Therefore the insurance contract is construed in

Turning to the issues at hand, the Court makes the
That on September 9th, 2003,

21

following findings of fact.

22

Burdene Shores was involved in an automobile accident, in

23

which she was a passenger and her husband Unior Shores was

24

driving.

25

The automobile driven by Mr. Shores was insured under
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a personal automobile policy issued by Liberty Mutual, with

2

coverage from January 12th, 2003 to January 12th, 2004.

3

The Liberty Mutual policy provides bodily injury

4

liability coverage of $100,000 for each person, and $300,000

5

per accident.

6

policy also includes a step-down or household exclusion, giving

7

an endorsement to the policy.

8
9

With respect to liability coverage, the Liberty

The provision states, "We do not provide liability
coverage for any insurer for bodily injury to you to the

10

extent that the limits of liability for this coverage exceed

11

the applicable minimum limits for liability specified by Utah

12

Code Annotated, Section 31(a)-32-304 . "

13

Policy then states what those minimum limits are.

14

Specifically, $65,000 for each accident, if the limit of

15

liability for this coverage is a single limit that applies

16

for each accident; or $25,000 for each person, $50,000 for

17

each accident, if the limited liability for this coverage is

18

indicated as a split limit.

19

Through her Counsel for Ms. Shores has demanded that

20

Liberty Mutual pay $100,000 under the policy as a result of the

21

accident for her injuries.

22

lawsuit for negligent driving against Mr. Shores, in an attempt

23

to collect under the liability coverage of the Liberty Mutual

24

policy.

25

Ms. Shores has filed a separate

Liberty Mutual has denied the defendant's demand based
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on the household exclusion, leaving that coverage is limited to

2

$25,000.

3

declaratory judgment as to that issue.

4

Liberty Mutual now, by way of summary judgment, seeks

To determine this issue, the Court is required to look

5

at case law beginning in 1985, and continuing through the year

6

2004.

7

Call, the Utah Supreme Court held that household or family

8

exclusion clauses in an automobile policy are contrary to

9

public policy and statutory requirements of the No Fault

10

In 1985 in the case of Farmer's Insurance Exchange vs.

Insurance Act, as to the minimum benefits provided by statute.

11

The plaintiff in that case, the insured, argued that

12

the household exclusion clause in the policy —

13

insured, the defendant in the case, called the insured, argued

14

that the household clause in the automobile policy was invalid

15

as to the policy limits in excess of the statutory amounts.

16

The Court declined to reach that question, and it is in effect

17

presented to this Court today.

18

I'm sorry.

The next case was approximately two years later.

The

That

19

is the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

20

vs. Nasbaum.

21

family exclusion in a polic —

22

prior to 1986 was valid and enforceable as to renounce in

23

benefits provided by the automobile policy in excess of amounts

24

which were statutorily mandated under the No Fault Insurance

25

Act.

In that case the Court held that a household or
in an automobile policy issued
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Justice Durham in that case wrote a dissenting opinion

2

in which she argued that the statutory language in Section

3

31(a)-22-309, and the legislative history of 31(a)-22-303

4

precluded a household exception in all insurance policies,

5

automobile policies, whether issued before 1986 or after 1986.

6

Justice Zimmerman, who concurred in the late opinion,

7

was persuaded by Justice Durham's opinion as it related to

8

automobile insurance policies that issued after 1986; and

9

Justice Stewart joined in that concurring opinion.

10

In 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of

11 I National Farmer's Union Property vs. Moore noted that the
12

concurring opinion and dissenting opinion were in fact dicta,

13

because that conclusion is not explained in that case, but the

14

Court concludes that the reason for that is because the policy

15

at issue in Nasbaum was issued before 1986.

16

never presented.

So the issue was

17

Since Nasbaum there has been notable silence on this

18

specific issue until the Supreme Court's holding this year in

19

Calhoun vs. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.

20

Now, that case —

in that case the pol —

automobile

21

policy excluded from coverage the insured's son, because he

22

had a —

23

acknowledges that the policies —

24

directly on point.

25

I believe a poor driving record.

So the Court

that the facts are not

Whether Calhoun sets forth a general rule of law for

-531

the State of Utah, which this Court is banned by, Calhoun

2

provides:

3

"Contrary to the Calhoun's assertions, exclusionary

4

endorsements such as the owned vehicle exception at issue are

5

not necessarily invalid.7'

6

The Calhoun case then quotes All State Insurance

7

Company vs. United States Fiduciary and Guaranty Company, a

8

1980 case, for this rule of law.

9

parties are free to limit coverage in excess of the minimum

Quote, "Rather, contracting

10

required limits, and an exclusion found in a contract is valid

11

in relation to any coverage exceeding minimum amounts."

12

The Court finds that that rule of law is binding

13

and on point and resolves the issue in this case; and grants

14

summary judgment on that question to the plaintiff.

15

Turning to the issue of clarity in the policy.

"In

16

order for the exclusion to be valid, it must be phrased in

17

language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the

18

insured the specific circumstances under which the expected

19

coverage will not be provided."

20

The plaintiffs —

the plaintiff in this case contends

21

that the language in the policy is —

22

The defendants contend that the policy is confusing and fails

23

to unmistakably communicate those circumstances under which

24

coverage is limited.

25

meets this standard.

After reviewing the language, the Court notes that
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it addresses complex issues.

2

However, it communicates those issues in a way that meets the

3

required standard under Calhoun.

4

There's no question about that.

I find that it clearly and unmistakably communicates

5

to the insured the specific circumstances under which the

6

expected coverage would not be provided to Burdene Shores.

7

As to that issue I rule in favor of the plaintiff.

8
9

The issue, thenf that remains in this case is
Mr. Shores' bad faith claim.

In the responsive memorandum

10

the defendants bring a host of factual allegations with respect

11

to misrepresentations that were made to induce the Shores to

12

enter into the insurance contract; and also what Ms. Shores

13

alleges to be unfair or fraudulent marketing tactics on the

14

part of the insurance company.

15

The Court finds that those issues go to the question

16

of bad faith; and that issue is not before me today.

17

reasons the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted.

18

Mr. Ricer will you prepare an order consistent with my

19

decision?

20

MR. RICE: I will, your Honor.

21

THE COURT: Thank you.

22

For those

Counsel, enjoy your weekend.

Thank you for your patience tonight.

23

MR. RICE: Thank you, sir.

24

MR. WHITMER: Thank you for your time.

25

(Hearing concluded)
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